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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. The issues on appeal have been properly preserved.
POINT II. Appellants have stated with precision the relief they seek on
appeal.

The lower court incorrecdy dismissed the remaining

counterclaims although Appellants presented unrebutted evidence
to support the elements of the remaining causes of action.
POINT III. The trial court did not properly apply the law to the facts.
The unrebutted evidence shows that Appellees intentionally
interfered with Appellants5 economic relations and wrongfully filed
suit after Appellees had cancelled the contract. Suit was filed for
the sole purpose of holding Appellants' property hostage, and tying
up Appellants' money in the Property, if Appellants would not
agree to sell the Property under the terms of the contract
previously cancelled by Appellees.
POINT IV. Appellants have properly marshalled the evidence.
POINT V. The trial court's conclusions are not justified in light of the
facts presented. The evidence marshalled by Appellants shows that
the trial court failed to properly apply the applicable law in Utah.
Appellants have presented unrebutted facts to support prima facie
cases for intentional interference with economic relations and
wrongful initiation of proceedings.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL HAVE BEEN PROPERLY
PRESERVED
The case cited by appellees, Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corp. 392
P.2d 620, 15 Utah 2d 318 (Utah 1964), dealt with the claim that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow separate trials.

The court was dealing with a

procedural matter. In the same paragraph cited by Appellees, at page 621, the
court states the following immediately before the statement cited by Appellees:
...(T)he record does not disclose any request for separate
trials by any of the appellants nor does it disclose any objection
to the court's decision to try the matter in one trial even though
different parcels and different interests would be affected. In view
of the fact that the record discloses no request for separate trial nor
any objection made to trying all the interests in one trial, this court
will not review an alleged error which the trial court was given no
opportunity to correct.
In Pettingill v. Perkins. 272 P.2d 185, 2 Utah 2d 266, (Utah 1954), which
was cited in the Porcupine case, the appellant had failed to object to a jury
instruction. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that it would "not review a
ground of objection not urged in the trial court."
The appeal before this court is not for any objection to procedure in the
lower court. This appeal has been filed because the trial court failed to find that
Appellants have presented prima facie cases of (1) interference with economic
interests and (2) wrongful filing of litigation. Appellees have not cited any rule
that requires a non-prevailing party to object to the lower court's ruling on the
merits before an appeal can be filed. In fact, as stated in Appellants' brief, the

2

Appellate court can "review the trial couil w legjlll i i inclusions tnicki n mnvclion
of-error standard according those concliisioris no particular deference/

Bellon

v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092, (Utah 1WI K
POINT

.APPELLANTS HAVE STATED WITH PRECISION THE

RELIEF THEY SEEK ON APPEAL
In Appellees Sumiuai "," n

Appellees claim dku Appellants

have not stated with precision the relief vwwcit Appellants seek or appeal
However, both issues presenled

r

appeal clearly question whether the *r-M n^in committed reversible erro

>

dismissing Appellants' causes of action I Sec Statement of Issues on Appeal
r

.

i s I an

opellants ask this eouu io reverse the ruling

of the trial court.
1•

:

II" II II III,

I ^ M _ >KiA*. v-w v . . . « _ ^ _ ; _ PROPERLY APPLY

_ ,

LAW TO THE FACTS
Tne facts presented h] ' appellants suppoil In till mil lln i nrivs ml lUinu
tried, i.e., intentional interference with prospective relations as set torth in Leigh
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. b:
i

- •*. . . . J vroagkd

iif nriirppdiinijis as set forth in. Crease y , Pleasant Grove Citv 519 P.2d

888 (Utah 1 v :±> and Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976). The elements
u-- t-iu»

» "(I liHiiili in ikh|>pt Hants Bill"! '.lailinp on payrs 7 and 16,

respectively. Rulings in both cases were based on the motive, intent, or purpose
..v., tlic lawsuils had been tilled.

3

In Leigh, the court found "improper means" when Isom was required:
...to defend what appear to have been two groundless
lawsuits.... Such use of civil litigation as a weapon to damage
another's business, besides being an intolerable waste of judicial
resources, may give rise to independent causes of action in tort for
abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Id at 309 (also cited
in Appellants' Brief at pages 10 and 11)
Although Appellees claim they acted in "good faithH when they recorded the lis
pendens and filed suit, there is undisputed evidence that Appellees had previously
cancelled and backed out of the Contract to purchase the Property. (R. 441, lines 7-18;
R. 450, lines 14-25; R. 443, lines 17 through R. 444, line 1. Also see Appellants' Brief,
Statement of Facts, pages 4-5 paragraphs 2-4.) Since Appellees had previously cancelled
the Contract, Appellees no longer had any contract rights to enforce. As such, the filing
of the suit itself was in fact improper since the only purpose of the suit was to attempt
to force Appellants to recognize the cancelled contract and force Appellants to sell the
Property to Appellees. By filing the lawsuit, Appellees intended to cause a hardship on
Appellants by preventing Appellants from selling the property to any third party, which
would tie up Appellants' money in the Property and cost Appellants legal fees and loss
of use of Appellants' money unless Appellants would sell to Appellees.
The Record was cited in Appellants' Brief, on pages 8, 9, 11 and 12, setting forth
the uncontroverted statements made to Mr. Huish by Mrs. Davis that show that the filing
of the suit by the Davises was for the purpose of preventing Appellants from selling the
Property to anybody else, which clearly interfered with Appellants' economic relations.
Furthermore, Finding of Fact No. 9 admits that "the recording of the lis pendens
interfered with the prospective economic relations of [Appellants]/
4

Had the Davises noi already etiJteiJ,IIUJI "l

,l ,ii ii,i,t

«»

««<»*«»»« and Icrmmalnl lln 11

right to purchase the Property, by words ^nti h* their a c t i o s (see Appellants' Brief
pages 4-5, paragraphs 2-4. and the Record citeu „-.. ^ i a paragraphs) pen haps the lliliiig
However, M r . Davis h;i*> manifested me

wouiu have been justified.

Davises' intent to terminate the contract by his statements to Mr. Huis, (k +•«,, nes
7

* " l>IH

IMK.S

M 'Si Tlu1 IV.

Ihoivnl'frr returned the key to the house to

Mr. Huish (R. 443, lines (7 K 4 ~ *
o* .,.,, ; ,wjK-rty M >:

\nv

caju

and the Davises never objected to the listing

•*

^

Brief paragraphs 2»4 e j. liius, the Davises' actions confirmed their intent to cancel, As
such, the lawsuit was not really filed to enforce a vaiia contrai

_

»

contract *-•- v-'t to resolve. •
The Davises claim there was probable cause for the suit when Appellants retained
tl

'

Ironically, the Davises dio not sue u? ?vco\

L11C

UJllUdWl.

>,000.00. There was no demand for

repayment in the compia);/
was

onjy

filed for "the specific purpose oi ^ : u r e n n r with the *K *r>env nebis of

Appellants. The Davises held the Property hostage hopmg Appellants would need to get
tin ii" m o o n "' i: ul of the Property hoping- this would force Appellants to decide whether
to face the legal and economic costs nr agree to seH tr i*e Davises
pin pose i1' \ Ii/ii i" mi",11«, mi i«

ni Appellants' claims

intentional interference with

economic interests and the wrongful initiation of proceedings.
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POINT IV: APPELLANTS HAVE PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE
The fourth point asserted by Appellees in their Brief is that "Utah law prohibits
the Appellants' from arguing the facts without marshalling the evidence/
The only evidence provided at the trial was the testimony of Mr. Huish.
Appellants have clearly marshalled the evidence as set forth in the testimony cited in the
Statement of Facts on pages 4 through 7 and on pages 8 through 14 of Appellants' Brief.
Specific testimony is quoted on pages 8, 9, 11-14, 16, 18, and 20. On pages 16 and 20
the record is cited for testimony presented which supports the elements of wrongful
initiation of proceedings.
As such, the evidence has clearly been marshalled by Appellants to support
Appellants' position that prima facie cases have been presented.
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT JUSTIFIED IN
LIGHT OF THE FACTS PRESENTED
The evidence presented by Appellants shows that prima facie cases for intentional
interference with economic relations and wrongful initiation of the lawsuit have been
established. The Davises' motive to hold the Property hostage and cause injury to
Appellants, if Appellants would not capitulate to the Davises' unjustified demands is
evident.
By reviewing the only facts before the trial court, Appellants have shown that
there was no contract to be enforced by the trial court. Appellees had backed out of it
and cancelled it - verbally, and by their actions and inaction (R. 441, lines 7-18; R.450,
lines 14-25; R. 443, lines 17 through R. 444, line 1; R. 444 lines 2-5; also see
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Appellants'Brief pages : ^ paragraph-. .

j^pptnct

in their brief that would indicate otherwise.

i

Nor have Appellees claimed tha^

Statement of Facts presented by Appellants is not true, Appellees ,.:•_: ::;
lirii ,„,!,„!!! nmt's findings and conclusions. Since 'opellees did not present *ny evidence at
trial, Appellants contend that the trial court ignored the evidence presented > . ^M..*.. as
;

It: i !Ii il

-.

"

•

'•

' '

: ;

' ' •

'" " •

The lower court's ruling has effectively condoned die "hostage-taking" ~c
Appellants property, and a demand for ransom, i • 5 i

v

cancelled or face all of the expenses and loss of the use of Appellants' money and
property while the property is tied up in court
thr f11iiI

' ider the facts presented in this case,

"' lur; nmdoiied lln," use of courts to attempt to revive contracts clearly

cancelled by one party. Such action allows the cancelling party to hold the property
hostage until i JIIMI1 Inniserable damages In llin noiH\mceIliiif> lunlv forcing (hi nil in
cancelling party to choose between suffering damages while defending its position or
capitulate to the demands of the party that cancelled,
As set forth above and in Appellants' Brief, the facts ui ihis ease Nearly show the
trial court erred in failing to properly find that Appellants have established a prima facie
case of intentiona 1 inter

< Mice with Appellants' economic relations as recognized by "this

court in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 65^ P ?d 293 (Utah 1982^ and as
recognized in GS Eritcip. »>^ \. i a»;i...,.» ^ v y

W (Mz

:

).

- The trial court also ignored that law in Crease v. Pleasant Grove City. 519 P.2d

The wrongful initiation of proceedings has been established in the Record wherein the
Davises have asked the lower court to compel Appellants to sell the Property to the
Davises which Appellants "would not otherwise be legally obligated to d o / Such use
of the court is an abuse of process by the Davises which should not be allowed.
CONCLUSION
The issues were properly argued and supported by facts presented at the trial.
However, the lower court ignored the law in its application of the law to the facts.
Inasmuch as Appellees had terminated their rights in the contract by words and actions,
the filing of the suit itself thereafter was wrongful. It was filed for the express purpose
of holding the property hostage with the intent to injure Appellants unless Appellants
agreed to sell the property to the Appellees under the terms of the contract the Appellees
had previously, unequivocally terminated.
Finally, Appellants have clearly marshalled the evidence to show cancellation of
the Contract, and the Davises' intent to injure Appellants if Appellants would not agree
to recognize the contract the Davises had previously cancelled. The facts support prima
facie cases of intentional interference with economic relations and wrongful initiation of
proceeds. As such, the dismissal by the lower court should be reversed and the matter
remanded, directing the trial court to receive evidence as to damages suffered by
Appellants and award damages based thereon.
Dated this \ ^

day of November, 1995.
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE
STEPHEN B. El flfiUFM

Stephen B. Elggren
Attorney for Appellants
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